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#2A-7/8/87 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-8755 
AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION. DIVISION 
726, AFL-CIO. 
Charging Party. 
ALBERT C. COSENZA. ESQ. (GEORGE S. GRUPSMITH. ESQ. of 
Counsel), for Respondent 
GLADSTEIN. REIF & MEGINNISS. ESQS. (WALTER M. MEGINNISS. 
JR., of Counsel), for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions of the charging party, 
the Amalgamated Transit Union, Division 726, AFL-CIO (ATU), to 
the dismissal, after hearing, of its charge against the 
respondent. New York City Transit Authority (Authority). The 
charge, as amended, alleged that the Authority violated 
§209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees Fair Employment Act (Act) 
when it unilaterally eliminated penalty standards for minor 
infractions of work rules. In its answer the Authority denied 
the charge and raised, as an affirmative defense, the claim 
that disciplinary penalties are a nonmandatory subject of 
bargaining. A hearing was held on October 9 and 10. 1986, at 
which both parties were represented by counsel and following 
which both parties filed briefs. 
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Although finding that the issue of penalty standards is a 
mandatory subject of bargaining, the Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ) assigned nevertheless dismissed the charge upon the 
ground that a disciplinary procedure negotiated by the parties 
replaced, by implication, the disciplinary standards previously 
in effect. In essence, the ALJ found that the ATU waived the 
right to bargain penalty standards when it negotiated a new 
disciplinary procedure, because the penalty standards were 
interrelated to the previous procedure which was replaced. The 
ALJ concluded, therefore, that all issues related to the 
imposition of discipline are now covered by the collective 
bargaining agreement rather than the Act* 
The ATU's exceptions to the ALJ's dismissal of the charge 
essentially assert that the ALJ was precluded from considering 
and deciding the case on the defense of waiver because it was 
not raised by respondent in its answer or at the hearing and 
that the record does not support a waiver defense in any.event. 
FACTS 
Early in 1985.— the Authority and ATU negotiated a 
Memorandum of Agreement which, among other things, created a 
new disciplinary procedure. The new procedure defines a 
disciplinary grievance as "a complaint on the part of any 
i^The date of execution or ratification of the parties' 
Memorandum of Agreement does not appear in the record, 
although, based upon its language, the Agreement appears to 
have been negotiated before March 31, 1985. 
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covered employee that there has been a violation of the 
employee's contractual rights with respect to a disciplinary 
action of a warning, reprimand, fine, suspension, demotion 
and/or dismissal . . .". and consists of four steps culminating 
in arbitration. Also included in the procedure is a 
pre-determination suspension procedure for certain enumerated 
offenses and agreement that the Authority may "increase, 
decrease or otherwise modify the decision made at the lower 
level" at any step of the procedure. (Appendix annexed to ALJ 
decision.) 
The record does not reveal which party proposed the new 
disciplinary procedure, nor does it contain the bargaining 
history of the contractual language embodying the procedure. 
Moreover, the parties specifically stipulated at the hearing 
that "Neither the Transit Authority nor the union raised any 
proposal or other discussion in the negotiations that led to 
[the parties' memorandum of agreement, containing the 
disciplinary procedure] regarding . . . the subject of 
disciplinary penalties . . . ." The Authority further asserted 
in its answer to the charge that "the disciplinary grievance 
procedure contains no standards or language regarding penalties 
for 'common and recurring infractions' and the Transit 
Authority has not negotiated such penalties with the ATU." 
(Answer par. 3) There is no record evidence that the issues of 
the disciplinary penalty applicable to a particular offense and 
the elimination of the previous penalties of cautions and 
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official cautions, and up to three days' suspensions for 
accumulated "minor violations" of work rules were discussed 
during the negotiation of the new disciplinary procedure. 
Additionally, it is uncontroverted that the elimination of the 
standards or guidelines was accomplished unilaterally by the 
Authority after the disciplinary procedure went into effect. 
The parties' previous procedure had included a 
departmental hearing, at which a reprimand and/or up to three 
days' suspension could be imposed, and either an informal trial 
board hearing (at which a maximum 60-day suspension could be 
imposed) or a formal trial board hearing (at which the ultimate 
penalty of termination could be imposed). This procedure 
existed, apparently, pursuant to §§75 and 76 of the Civil 
Service Law, although it represents some variations thereon. 
In conjunction with this disciplinary procedure, for many 
years prior to February 1. 1986. a set of penalties had applied 
to certain infractions of work rules. 
The penalty standards at issue provided that certain 
specific infractions of work rules would result in the 
imposition of cautions and official cautions, and that 
accumulation of a specified number of these would result in the 
imposition of a reprimand or warning or up to three days' 
suspension. The issuance of a reprimand or suspension was 
apparently subject to appeal under the prior disciplinary 
procedure, while cautions and official cautions were not. 
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In particular, an employee who was late for work by less 
than two hours, was late in reporting for overtime work, or who 
was late in notifying the Authority of illness would receive a 
"caution". An employee would receive an "official caution" if 
he was late by two hours or more, failed to submit proof of 
claimed family illness, was late for overtime duty more than 
five times in one year, ran his bus ahead of schedule, was 
responsible for an accident, or accumulated five cautions in 
one year. An employee would be subject to a departmental 
hearing at which a reprimand or up to three days1 suspension 
could be imposed if he accumulated three official cautions in 
one year (or two official cautions for the same offense). Any 
employee who had received three departmental hearings during 
his employment was thereafter precluded from departmental 
hearings, and proceeded directly, regardless of the offense, to 
an informal or formal trial board. An employee dissatisfied 
with the outcome of a departmental or informal trial board 
hearing had the right to appeal to the formal trial board. 
Apparently, as to other or more significant work rule 
infractions or misconduct, the procedure began with a 
departmental or trial board hearing, and the penalty sought was 
established on a case-by-case basis. 
On or about February 1. 1986, the Authority unilaterally 
(by its own admission) eliminated the use of the 
above-described penalty guidelines or standards, and eliminated 
the use of cautions and official cautions for the offenses for 
11017 
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which they had previously been issued. Instead, penalties are 
established for each offense on a case-by-case basis, and the 
employee, if he objects to the penalty, is entitled to file a 
disciplinary grievance. 
The Authority contended in its answer to the charge that 
it was entitled to unilaterally impose different penalties than 
had theretofore been applied to minor offenses upon the ground 
that disciplinary penalties are a nonmandatory subject of 
bargaining. It did not contend, until submission of its 
post-hearing brief, that the new disciplinary procedure 
permitted it to impose new (and greater) penalties or that the 
union waived the right to bargain concerning penalties or 
bargained away those standards by implication when it agreed to 
the new procedure. The procedure is silent on the issue of 
penalties applicable to specific offenses. 
DISCUSSION 
ATU points out in its exceptions that this Board's Rules 
and Regulations require that the answer "shall include a 
specific admission, denial or explanation of each allegation of 
the charge ..." and shall include "a specific detailed 
statement of any affirmative defense ..." [§204.3(c) (1) and 
(2).] ATU further asserts that the defense of waiver (or 
negotiation to conclusion of a subject covered by a collective 
bargaining agreement) is an affirmative defense, which is 
required by our rules to be pleaded in the answer to a charge. 
ATU argues that failure of the Authority to raise this 
"11018 
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affirmative defense in the answer or to assert it in any other 
manner at or before the hearing deprived it of notice of the 
defense and of the opportunity to present evidence in 
rebuttal. It therefore contends that the ALJ erred when she 
considered this defense and based her dismissal of the charge 
solely upon a finding of waiver. 
It is clear that the Authority did not raise contract 
waiver as an affirmative defense in its answer, nor did it seek 
to amend its answer at any time. It is also clear from the 
record that the Authority at no time prior to its post-hearing 
memorandum argued that the parties had already bargained the 
entire disciplinary process (both procedure and penalties) to 
conclusion when they entered into their memorandum of agreement 
or that the ATU waived the right to bargain the issue of 
penalty standards. We, therefore, find that the ATU was not on 
notice of the defense of waiver and did not have the 
opportunity to present evidence in rebuttal. 
We agree with ATU that contract waiver is an affirmative 
defense which must be pleaded in the answer to a charge. 
Failure to raise the defense would be likely to take a charging 
party by surprise and would also raise new issues of fact not 
appearing on the face of the prior pleadings -- criteria 
contained in CPLR §3018(b). which, in the interest of fairness 
to the parties in proceedings before this Board, ought to apply 
here also. 
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CPLR §3018(b) defines affirmative defenses as "all matters 
which if not pleaded would be likely to take the adverse party 
by surprise or would raise issues of fact not appearing on the 
face of a prior pleading . . . ." We see no reason why the same 
terminology appearing in our Rules should not be similarly 
defined. In the instant case. ATU asserts both surprise and the 
raising of new or additional factual issues by the contract 
waiver defense. We agree that these assertions are supported by 
the evidence. This is particularly so in light of the absence 
of the claim of waiver and of the Authority's affirmative claim 
that the issue of penalties was not negotiated. 
We therefore find that contract waiver is an affirmative 
defense and that respondent's failure to raise the defense until 
its post-hearing brief barred it from doing so at all. We also 
therefore find that the ALJ erred in considering the defense of 
2/ 
waiver and deciding the case before her on that basis.— 
Having set aside the waiver defense, we turn to the 
question of whether disciplinary penalty standards are a 
mandatory subject of bargaining. We affirm the decision of the 
ALJ that they are indeed a mandatory subject, in keeping with 
^While we need not reach the merits of the Authority's 
waiver argument, we note that its failure to raise this 
argument until its post-hearing brief and its stipulation that 
the subject of disciplinary penalties was not negotiated 
suggest that it did not understand its negotiations as having 
dealt with the penalty standards for minor infractions. 
"11020 
Board - U-8755 -9 
the line of decisions of this Board and the courts so 
3/ holding.- The Authority has. by its own admission. 
unilaterally changed the disciplinary penalty standard in effect 
prior to February 1. 1986. and we find that in doing so it 
violated §209-a.l(d) of the Act. 
The Authority is therefore ordered to: 
1. Restore the penalty standards in effect prior to 
January 31, 1986; 
2. Restore to affected employees any time and/or wages 
lost that would not have been lost but for the 
elimination of said penalty standards; 
3. Amend any and all records of disciplinary action taken 
since January 31. 1986 against any unit employee so as 
to delete any reference to disciplinary action that 
would not have been taken had the said penalty 
standards remained in effect and substituting therefor 
the disciplinary action, if any, that would have been 
taken; 
j/Binqhamton Civil Service Forum v. City of Binqhamton. 44 
N.Y.2d 23, 11 PERB 1f7508 (1978) ("the proper penalty to be imposed" 
as discipline was determined to be a term and condition of 
employment under the Act); Auburn Police Local 195. Council 82. 
AFSCME. AFL-CIO v. Helsby. 91 Misc.2d 909, 10 PERB 1f70l6 (Sup. Ct. 
Alb. Co. 1977). aff'd. 62 A.D.2d 12. 11 PERB 1f7003 (3rd Dep't 1978). 
aff'd. 46 N.Y.2d 1034. 12 PERB V7006 (1979) (demand entitled 
"Discipline and Discharge." which included a provision restricting 
disciplinary penalties, found to be a mandatory subject of 
bargaining); City of Albany. 56 A.D.2d 976, 10 PERB T7006 (3rd Dep't 
1977) (PERB's determination that a unilateral change in the penalty 
imposed for tardiness violated §209-a.l(d) of the Act was upheld). 
See also County of Orange. 19 PERB ir4579 (1986). 
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4. Cease and desist from failing to negotiate in good 
faith with charging party; and 
5. Sign and post the attached notice at all locations 
customarily used to communicate with unit employees. 
DATED: July 8. 19 87 
Albany. New York 
^ A 4 ^ 
rold R. Newman,^Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
4> 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL E 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees represented by the Amalgamated Transit Union, 
Division 726, AFL-CIO, that the New York City Transit Authority: 
1. Will restore the penalty standards in effect prior to 
January 31, 1986. 
2. Will restore to affected employees any time and/or wages lost 
that would not have been lost but for the elimination of said 
penalty standards. 
3. Will amend any and all records of disciplinary action taken since 
January 31, 1986 against any unit employee so as to delete any reference 
to disciplinary action that would not have been taken had the said 
penalty standards remained in effect and substituting therefor the 
disciplinary action, if any, that would have been taken. 
4. Will negotiate in good faith with the .Amalgamated Transit Union, 
Division 726, AFL-GIO. 
New York City Transit Authority 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered 
defaced, or covered by any other material. _ 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED UNIVERSITY PROFESSIONS. 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-8347 
THOMAS C. BARRY, 
Charging Party. 
In the Matter of 
UNITED UNIVERSITY PROFESSIONS. 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-8 664 
MORRIS E. ESON. 
Charging Party. 
In the Matter of 
UNITED UNIVERSITY PROFESSIONS. 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-8795 
MORRIS E. ESON. 
Charging Party. 
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In the Matter of 
UNITED UNIVERSITY PROFESSIONS, 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-8890 
GORDON GALLUP, 
Charging Party. 
In the Matter of 
UNITED UNIVERSITY PROFESSIONS, 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-8859 
THOMAS C. BARRY, 
Charging Party. 
BERNARD F. ASHE, ESQ. (IVOR MOSKOWITZ. ESQ.. of 
Counsel), for Respondent, in Case Nos. U-8347, U-8664, 
U-8795. U-8890 & U-8859 
THOMAS C. BARRY, p_ro se, in Case Nos. U-8347 & U-8859 
GLENN M. TAUBMAN, ESQ.. National Right to Work Legal 
Defense Foundation, for Charging Parties, in Case Nos. 
U-8664, U-8795 & U-8890 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
These matters come to us on the exceptions of the United 
University Professions (UUP) and the three charging parties, 
Thomas C. Barry, Morris E. Eson and Gordon Gallup, to three 
separate decisions of Administrative Law Judges (ALJ) 
u sn 
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sustaining, in part, improper practice charges filed by the 
three charging parties.— In Case No. U-8347, the charging 
party alleged that UUP's agency shop fee refund procedures 
for 1984-85 and 1985-86 violated, in several respects, 
§209-a.2(a) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act). In Case No. U-8664, the charging party alleged that 
UUP's agency shop fee refund procedures for 1984-85 and 
1985-86 violated the same provision of the Act in several 
respects. In Case Nos. U-8795, U-8890 and U-8859, the 
respective charging parties alleged that UUP's agency shop 
fee refund procedure for 1986-87 violates, in several 
respects, the same provision of the Act. 
PROCEDURES 
The UUP agency shop fee refund procedures for 1984-85 
and 1985-86 are substantively identical. The 1986-87 UUP 
agency shop fee refund procedure, however, is substantially 
different. These procedures are attached hereto as 
Appendices A, B, and C. respectively. 
The 1984-85 and 1985-86 procedures provide that 
objections must be filed between September 1 and September 30 
i^An ALJ decision was issued on October 23. 1986, in 
Case No. U-8347 (19 PERB ir4603). A second consolidated 
decision was issued by an ALJ in Case Nos. U-8664. U-8795 
and U-8890 on February 19. 1987 (20 PERB 1F4515). A third 
decision was issued by an ALJ in Case No. U-8859 on March 
12. 1987 (20 PERB ir4523). We heard a consolidated oral 
argument in all five cases on June 1. 1987. 
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of the fiscal year for which a refund is requested. They 
provide that, thereafter, each such objector would receive an 
advance reduction in agency fees based on the latest fiscal 
year for which a completed audit is available. Under these 
procedures, the charging parties would not receive their 
advance reduction check until sometime in October of the fiscal 
year in question, as did, in fact, happen. The single payment 
made at that time represents UUP's reduction of the fee for the 
year. The procedures provide that after the end of the fiscal 
year, when the audit for that fiscal year has been completed, 
the actual proportion of agency fees spent for refundable 
purposes would be computed and an adjustment would be made. 
The objector would receive the excess over the reduction, if 
any, or would be liable to UUP for any excess in the advance 
reduction he may have received. If an objector were 
dissatisfied at that point, an appeal could be filed with the 
UUP Executive Board by registered or certified mail within 30 
days of receipt of the final refund determination. If 
dissatisfied with the Executive Board's determination, the 
objector could, by notifying UUP by registered or certified 
mail, appeal to a neutral to be appointed by UUP from lists 
2/ 
maintained by the American Arbitration Association (AAA).— 
^Although UUP's procedure, as published, allows it to 
select the neutral, UUP advised those objectors who had 
appealed to the neutral stage that the AAA would pick the 
neutral, which it did. 
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The 1986-87 agency shop fee refund procedure differs 
substantially. It provides that objections must be filed by 
registered or certified mail between June 15 and June 30 of 
the year prior to the fiscal year to which the objection 
applies. The procedures provide that each such objector 
would receive, at the beginning of the new fiscal year, an 
advance payment equal to the amount of the reduction in 
agency fees determined by the union to represent the 
employee's pro rata share of refundable expenditures. Such 
advance reduction would be determined on the basis of the 
"latest fiscal year for which there is a completed and 
available audit". If an objector were dissatisfied with the 
amount of the advance reduction, the objector could file an 
appeal by registered or certified mail within 30 days of the 
receipt of such advance reduction payment. The procedure 
provides that such appeal would be submitted by the union to 
a neutral appointed by the AAA. This procedure does not 
provide for any recoupment by UUP from the objector of any 
excess in the advance reduction the objector may have 
received. 
In summary, both procedures provide for an advance 
reduction method of payment of amounts due the agency fee 
payer. The earlier procedure does not provide for an appeal 
from the advance reduction determination. The only appeal 
provided for is from a final refund determination made after 
"11028 
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the end of the fiscal year. The 1986-87 procedure, on the 
other hand, authorizes an appeal from the advance reduction 
determination but does not contemplate any avenue of review 
of the correctness of the amount of agency fees actually 
collected during the 1986-87 fiscal year after the year has 
closed. 
ALJ DECISIONS 
The ALJs concluded that UUP's agency shop fee refund 
procedures for the three years in question are improper in 
several respects. They did not, however, sustain some of the 
claims of impropriety made by the charging parties. In our 
following discussion, we shall attempt to deal with all of 
the issues raised by the exceptions filed by the charging 
3/ parties, as well as by the UUP.— 
FINDINGS 
Having considered the exceptions of the charging parties 
and UUP in Case Nos. U-8347 and U-8664. we find that the 
1984-85 and 1985-86 procedures are improper and violate 
§§209-a.2(a) and 208.3(a) of the Act in the following 
respects: 
1/Barry has moved to disqualify the Chairman of this 
Board on the grounds of bias and prejudice. The Chairman 
has determined that Barry's claims do not warrant his 
disqualification, and he has declined to recuse himself 
from consideration of these cases. Barry has previously 
been notified of this disposition of his motion. 
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There is no provision for an application for 
a refund until after the start of the fiscal 
year, which allows UUP the use of the agency 
fee payments prior to any advance reduction. 
No financial information was provided to the 
agency fee payers prior to an opportunity to 
object to the advance reduction 
determination. 
The advance reduction determination was not 
based on an outside audit of those 
expenditures which are deemed refundable and 
those which are not. 
There is no provision for an appeal of the 
amount of the advance reduction. 
The appeal procedure was not reasonably 
prompt and expeditious, inasmuch as no 
appeal was authorized from the advance 
reduction determination. The subsequent 
appeal from the end-of-year determination 
cannot be considered reasonably prompt. The 
use of intermediate steps in the appeal 
process, such as an appeal to the Executive 
Board, is unnecessary, coercive and causes 
undue delay. 
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6. The requirement that objectors notify UUP by 
certified or registered mail of their 
initial objection as well as at each step of 
the appellate procedure is coercive. 
We also find that the 1986-87 procedure is improper and 
violates §§209-a.2(a) and 208.3(a) of the Act in the following 
respects: 
1. The 15-day period in June for the filing of 
the initial objection to agency fees for the 
upcoming fiscal year is unreasonably short 
and occurs at a time when school is not in 
session. Accordingly, the objection period 
is found to be unreasonable and coercive. 
2. The procedures do not provide for the 
furnishing of financial information prior to 
the filing of objections by agency fee payers. 
3. The requirement that objectors notify UUP by 
certified or registered mail of their 
objection and at each step of the appellate 
procedure is coercive. 
4. The advance reduction determination is not 
based upon an outside audit of those 
expenditures which are deemed refundable and 
those which are not. 
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5. There is no provision for placing the amount 
of fees reasonably in dispute in an 
interest-bearing escrow account pending the 
neutral's determination. 
6. Hearing as to the correctness of the advance 
reduction is not held within a reasonable 
time. 
7. There is no procedure for end-of-year 
correction. 
We have considered other claims made by the charging 
parties with regard to aspects of UUP's procedures, and find 
them without merit. 
DISCUSSION 
In reviewing UUP's 1984-85 and 1985-86 procedures, we are 
mindful of the fact that such procedures were established 
prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Chicago 
4/ 
Teachers Union v. Hudson.— We recognize, as do the 
parties, that that decision is of paramount importance in 
evaluating all three procedures that are subject to review 
herein. 
5/ We have previously considered the 1984-85 procedure.— 
In that prior case, however, we dealt only with the claim 
±' U.S. . 106 S.Ct. 1066. 19 PERB T7502 (1986). 
^UUP (Barry and Eson) . 18 PERB 1P063 (1985). 
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that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Ellis v. Railway 
Clerks- requires a procedure in which 100% of the agency 
fee must be placed in escrow. We concluded that neither Ellis 
nor CSL §208.3 requires a union to place 100% of its agency 
fees in escrow. We held that CSL §208.3 does not foreclose 
the use of an advance reduction method as part of an 
acceptable refund procedure. Since the charges in that case 
did not challenge specific elements of UUP's procedure, we did 
not consider whether UUP's procedure was an acceptable advance 
reduction method. We stated (at 3131): 
We would, however, note that any method 
selected by a union must provide reasonable 
assurance that the interests of the objecting 
nonmembers are protected. Any such procedure 
should be designed to avoid the "involuntary 
loan" to which the Supreme Court objected. 
Attention must, therefore, be directed to 
theOtiming of the advance reduction 
determination and its implementation, as well 
as the basis upon which the amount of the 
advance reduction is determined. Other 
aspects may also be subject to further 
scrutiny. 
We must now review the propriety of specific elements of 
UUP's procedures in light of the Ellis and Hudson decisions. 
Those decisions currently reflect the constitutional 
considerations which must govern our construction of §208.3. 
In Hudson, the Supreme Court restated the fundamental 
concern that the union refund procedure may not. even 
6-/466 U.S. 435. 17 PERB T7511 (1984). 
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temporarily, permit objectors' funds to be used for improper 
purposes. The Court emphasized that procedural safeguards are 
necessary to minimize the infringement on objectors' First 
Amendment rights and that union procedures must be "carefully 
7/ tailored"— to accomplish that purpose. In addition, the 
nonunion employees must have a "fair opportunity to identify 
8/ the impact"— of the action taken by the union on their 
interests so as to be able to assert a meritorious claim. 
Accordingly, the Court required a union to provide nonmembers 
with adequate information about the basis for the union's 
determination before the nonmember exercises his option to 
object. In addition, the need for adequate procedural 
safeguards requires the union to provide an appellate 
procedure which will insure "a reasonably prompt decision by 
. . 9/ 
an impartial decision maker. "^ -
In Hudson, the Supreme Court reviewed an agency shop fee 
refund procedure which incorporated an advance reduction of 
the agency shop fee. It is important to note, however, that 
the advance reduction method analyzed by the Supreme Court in 
Hudson is different than the advance reduction method adopted 
Z/l9 PERB at p. 7502. 
8/Id. 
S-'ld. at p. 7509. 
1 1 C 
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by UUP. The union in Hudson determined that the agency shop 
fee should be 95% of the dues paid by members and notified 
the employer to deduct during the year from the nonmembers' 
salaries only 95% of the members' dues. Each periodic 
deduction from salary was accordingly reduced. In contrast, 
UUP has chosen to collect the full amount of the fee (an 
amount equivalent to dues) during the year but to give the 
agency fee payer at or near the beginning of the year a 
single payment representing its estimate of the refund due 
the agency fee payer. Based on the method it has chosen, UUP 
urges that practical difficulties related to that method 
should be taken into consideration. 
The Supreme Court, however, has articulated 
constitutional standards to which all procedures must 
adhere. While an advance reduction method is 
constitutionally acceptable in principle, any such method 
must be "carefully tailored" to minimize the infringement of 
First Amendment rights and provide adequate safeguards to 
assure that agency fees will not be used by the union in a 
manner which violates objecting nonmembers1 rights. The 
application of the constitutional standards may require 
different procedures depending on the method chosen by the 
union. At the same time, no method may be any less 
protective of the objector's rights than any other method 
which the union could have chosen. Thus, for example, a 
procedure based on placing 100% of the agency fees in escrow 
"11035 
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could differ substantially from the procedure required of UUP 
by virtue of the advance reduction method which it has 
chosen. Inasmuch as the 100% escrow method "eliminates the 
risk that nonunion employees' contributions may be 
temporarily used for impermissible purposes",—the 
procedures can be fashioned without concern for that risk. 
If the advance reduction method chosen by UUP is to be 
utilized, it must provide for payment of the advance 
reduction before any agency fees are deducted during the 
fiscal year in question. Only payment at that time can avoid 
the risk of temporary use of objectors' money for 
impermissible purposes. It follows that UUP must make its 
determination before the fiscal year begins. The State's 
"lag payroll" cannot justify the possibility that some of the 
agency fee payers' money will be used, even temporarily, for 
improper purposes. 
The Hudson decision makes clear that if a union chooses 
to use an advance reduction method, pursuant to which a 
determination is made regarding which expenses are chargeable 
to the nonmember and which are not. notice of that 
determination must be given to all agency fee payers. No 
agency fee payer is required to object until after the union 
has made its determination. If the union chooses to make a 
IP-/Id. at p. 7510. 
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single lump-sum payment of the advance reduction as part of 
its determination, the union must make that payment to all 
agency fee payers.— Such notice and payment should be 
made simultaneously by mail directly to each affected 
employee. 
Inasmuch as the advance reduction method chosen by UUP 
requires a refund determination by UUP, UUP must furnish 
adequate financial information with the payment/ 
determination. It follows that such financial information 
must be furnished to all agency fee payers at the same time 
as notice of the determination and payment is given, and by 
the same means. Furnishing such financial information solely 
through UUP's newspaper does not sufficiently protect the 
rights of nonmembers. As the Supreme Court stated in 
Hudson: "Basic considerations of fairness, as well as 
concern for the First Amendment rights at stake, also dictate 
that the potential objectors be given sufficient information 
to gauge the propriety of the union's fee." (Emphasis 
12/ 
supplied)— Hudson also requires that the financial 
information furnished to the nonmember be based on an 
ii./Obviously, if a union chooses to place all agency 
fees in an escrow account until a final determination is 
made, this requirement would not be necessary. 
i ^ / 1 9 PERB a t p p . 7 5 0 8 - 0 9 . 
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audit by an independent auditor.— 
The 1984-85 and 1985-86 procedures do not provide for an 
immediate appeal from the advance reduction payment/ 
determination. The 1986-87 procedure does. Clearly, 
however, the Hudson decision requires that a reasonably 
prompt decision by a neutral decision maker must follow that 
determination. Agency fee payers who wish to challenge the 
advance reduction payment/determination must be given an 
opportunity at that time to file their objections. Based on 
the financial information furnished to them, they may then be 
in a position to make a reasoned decision whether to object 
to the determination. 
The Supreme Court in Hudson stated that the objector "is 
entitled to have his objections addressed in an expeditious. 
il/lnasmuch as the financial information furnished by 
UUP was not audited and was not made available at the 
appropriate time and in the appropriate manner, the 
procedure followed by the UUP regarding such information 
must be found improper. The issue is also raised as to the 
sufficiency of the information actually furnished by UUP. 
We are of the opinion that our prior decisions setting 
forth with some detail what we considered to be sufficient 
information (see, e.g., Hampton Bays Teachers Ass'n. 14 
PERB 1f3018 [1981], and Westbury Teachers Ass'n. 15 PERB 
1P100 [1982]) are not inconsistent with the decision in 
Hudson. Indeed, the Supreme Court's reference to the 
disclosure requirements of the Labor Management Reporting 
and Disclosure Act (Hudson at p. 7509) is similar to our 
reference to the State Industrial Commissioner's reporting 
requirements (Hampton Bays at p. 3031). We conclude that 
the information furnished by UUP sufficiently identified 
those disbursements which it determined to be refundable 
and those which it determined not to be refundable, and 
permitted objectors to gauge the propriety of UUP's fee. 
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14/ fair and objective manner."— Among other things, the 
objections must be heard promptly by a neutral decision maker 
15/ 
who is not selected by UUP.— The procedure must also be 
accomplished in a reasonably prompt manner. Inasmuch as the 
1984-85 and 1985-86 procedures provide for review by the 
neutral only after the end of the fiscal year and after the 
audit of UUP's books is completed, it is manifest that such 
an appeal procedure cannot be considered expeditious and 
cannot be expected to arrive at a reasonably prompt 
16/ 
conclusion.— 
Inasmuch as UUP's earlier procedures contemplate no 
appeal from the advance reduction payment/determination and 
contemplate a "final rebate determination" after the end of 
M./19 PERB at p. 7509. 
i^/uuP has indicated that it has amended its 1984-85 
and 1985-86 procedures to provide that the neutral shall be 
selected by the American Arbitration Association and not by 
UUP. 
i6-/UUP's reliance upon our decision in UUP (Eson). 12 
PERB ir3093 (1979) is misplaced. In that case, we 
considered the question of expedition in the context of a 
"pure rebate procedure". The Ellis decision determined 
that such a procedure is constitutionally improper. The 
earlier procedures here under review retain the appellate 
process applicable to a "pure rebate procedure" while 
engrafting the advance reduction payment/determination. 
The method chosen by UUP requires an entirely new look at 
the issue of expedition. UUP's 1986-87 procedure 
recognizes, in part, the need for a more expeditious 
procedure. Nevertheless, UUP may have acted on the basis 
of, and consistent with, our earlier decision. We do not 
intend to penalize UUP retroactively because of the later 
teaching in Hudson. 
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the fiscal year, UUP was confronted with the possibility that 
the "final rebate determination" may be less than the advance 
reduction. Its earlier procedures therefore include a 
provision contemplating the recoupment of any excess paid to 
the agency fee payer. The ALJ concluded that such a 
provision was not improper. The 1986-87 procedure eliminates 
the recoupment provision. The issue arises only because of 
UUP's failure to provide for a proper advance reduction 
procedure and escrow of an amount that might reasonably be in 
dispute. If a proper procedure had been adopted, there would 
be no occasion for a recoupment. 
The earlier procedures also provide that after the 
"final rebate determination" is made, the union will make an 
adjustment in the refund amount, if necessary. The ALJ 
properly concluded that such a provision is violative of the 
Act because it suggests the real possibility that additional 
refunds may be made after UUP has had the use of the 
objector's money for a year. UUP urges that this has not 
happened and that therefore it is not a real possibility. 
Nevertheless, the Ellis and Hudson decisions require that 
such a provision be found violative of the Act. Furthermore, 
the entire question can be avoided by the establishment of a 
proper advance reduction and escrow procedure. 
In Hudson, the Supreme Court required that an appeal 
follow the union's advance reduction determination. It 
permitted the union to justify its determination "on the 
°ilC40 
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17/ basis of its expenses during the preceding year."— 
Inasmuch as the actual expenses in the year in question may 
differ from the preceding year, the Court required the union 
to place in escrow all amounts that might reasonably be in 
dispute while challenges are pending. 
18/ We have previously pointed out— that any advance 
reduction method accompanied by a partial escrow is 
problematic since it leaves open the possibility that, during 
the current year, some portion of the nonmembers' fees might 
be used temporarily for rebatable purposes. It appears that 
the Supreme Court sought to avoid this possibility by 
requiring the escrow of all amounts "reasonably in dispute" 
while challenges are pending. It would appear that the 
Supreme Court has recognized that absolute protection of the 
nonmembers from an "involuntary loan" cannot be guaranteed 
short of a 100% escrow method. As we previously stated, we 
believe the Supreme Court intends that "the procedure chosen 
by a union should provide reasonable assurance that agency 
fees will not be used by the union in a manner which violates 
19/ the objecting nonmembers' rights".— 
To avoid the possibility of a nonmember's overpayment 
during the current year, which could not be refunded until 
iZ''19 PERB at p. 7509 n. 18. 
J ^ U U P ( B a r r y and E s o n ) . 18 PERB 1P063 ( 1 9 8 5 ) . 
^ 2 / l d . a t 3131 
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the following year, the amount of the partial escrow or 
advance reduction must include a "cushion" or margin of 
safety which recognizes that the rebate portion of the 
union's expenditures may vary from year to year. It is also 
clear that if the advance reduction determination is based on 
an independent audit of refundable and nonrefundable 
expenditures, the union will be in a better position to judge 
what amounts may be "reasonably in dispute". The inquiry by 
the neutral may appropriately include an examination as to 
whether a prior year's expenditures are a good predictor of 
the current year's. In addition, a neutral may appropriately 
inquire as to expenditures during the current year, which 
could alter the result reached by reliance on a preceding 
year. In any event, we determine that UUP should provide a 
"cushion" of not less than 10 percent of the audited amount 
for the base year. 
If the "cushion" is included in an advance reduction. 
UUP may not recoup it if at the end of the year it is 
determined that such amount would have been properly 
collected by the union. It may, however, recoup such monies 
from a partial escrow account. 
While this may be all that is constitutionally required, 
§208.3 of the Act also requires that a union must establish 
and maintain "a procedure providing for the refund to any 
employee demanding the return [of] any part of an agency shop 
fee deduction which represents the employee's pro rata share 
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of expenditures by the organization . . . ." Section 208.3 
requires, therefore, a second audit and appeal procedure — 
directed to the actual expenses of UUP after the year is 
completed. This need not occasion any substantial additional 
difficulties for UUP. Such an audit and appeal procedure is 
required in any event so long as UUP utilizes the advance 
reduction method, because the audit statement of expenses for 
the year past (presumably to be completed about six months 
after the end of the fiscal year) will serve as the basis of 
the advance reduction for the year to come. 
As we have previously indicated, the Supreme Court in 
Hudson required the adoption of procedures that are "carefully 
tailored to minimize the infringement" on the nonmembers 
constitutional rights. This means that affected employees 
must have a fair opportunity to identify the impact of the 
union's actions on their interests and to assert a meritorious 
First Amendment claim. We find that the 15-day period for 
filing initial objections, afforded by the 1986-87 procedure, 
20/ is too short to satisfy this requirement.— The filing 
period must be at least 30 days long. Furthermore, we find 
that the procedure is flawed in that the filing period is set 
at a time when the State University is not in regular session 
20/To the extent that our decision in UUP (Eson)« 11 
PERB 1f3074 (1978), approved a 15-day period, we overrule 
that decision in that respect. 
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and. therefore, faculty members are likely to be away from the 
University and may miss this opportunity to file objections. 
The period must be moved back to a time when the University is 
in regular session. 
We have previously approved UUP1s requirement that 
objectors must file an initial objection as well as all 
21/ 
notices of appeal by certified or registered mail.— Upon 
further consideration, we have concluded that such requirement 
is unnecessarily burdensome. Given the cost of certified mail 
and the availability of other reasonably reliable and less 
burdensome methods of filing, we find that the certified mail 
requirement for initial filing and appellate steps is coercive 
within the meaning of the Act. Accordingly, we overrule our 
earlier decision in this regard. 
We also conclude that nothing in Hudson requires us to 
overrule our previous decisions finding that UUP's manner of 
communicating with its employees is proper, except to the 
extent that our decision in the instant case requires a direct 
mailing to each affected employee. 
Finally, we affirm the ALJ's finding that the selection 
of the neutral by the American Arbitration Association 
JLIk/uup (Eson). supra . 
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pursuant to the AAA's rules for agency fee arbitrations is 
proper. Objections to a particular neutral's conduct must be 
dealt with, if at all. in a plenary court action. 
REMEDY 
We conclude that it would effectuate the purposes of the 
Act to direct full refunds to each of the charging parties for 
the years concerning which they filed charges. Such relief, 
however, should not be afforded nonmembers who have not filed 
charges. We cannot presume objection to the agency fee 
procedure by all nonmembers. 
UUP established its procedures under review herein in 
accordance with its understanding of the Ellis and Hudson 
decisions and of the standards prescribed by us in prior 
decisions. We now determine that substantial changes in the 
standards are required by the Supreme Court's recent 
decisions. It would not be reasonable to expect UUP to have 
anticipated all these changes. Accordingly, our remedial order 
will be prospective in its application. This approach is 
similar to the one we followed in UUP (Eson), 11 PERB 1P068 
(1978). 
We shall direct UUP promptly to establish agency shop 
refund procedures that are consistent with the standards set 
forth in this decision. We shall direct UUP to submit such 
revised procedures to us within 30 days for review and 
approval. We shall retain jurisdiction of these proceedings 
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for such purposes as may be necessary to effectuate the 
policies of the Act. 
NOW. THEREFORE. WE ORDER United University Professions to 
do the following: 
1. Forthwith refund to Barry and Eson the 
total amount of agency fees deducted from 
their salaries for the 1984-85, 1985-86 
and 1986-87 fiscal years, with interest 
at the maximum legal rate. 
2. Forthwith refund to Gallup the total 
amount of agency fees deducted from his 
salary for the 1986-87 fiscal year, with 
interest at the maximum legal rate. 
3. Submit to this Board within 30 days of 
the date of this order a revised agency 
shop refund procedure which is in 
conformity with this decision, together 
with steps for immediate implementation 
thereof. Should UUP fail to do so, it 
shall immediately cease and desist from 
implementing the 1984-85. 1985-86. 
1986-87 and any subsequent agency shop 
refund procedures, including accepting 
deductions from agency fee payers, and 
\j 
Board - U-8347. U-8664. U-8795, 
U-8890 & U-8859 -24 
shall forthwith refund directly to all 
agency fee payers any deductions that may 
be made from the date of receipt of this 
decision and order, with interest at the 
maximum legal rate. Pending approval by 
this Board of the timely submitted 
revised agency shop refund procedure. UUP 
may continue in effect its existing 
procedures, unless directed otherwise by 
this Board. This Board shall retain 
jurisdiction of these proceedings for 
such purposes as may appear to the Board 
to be necessary to effectuate the 
policies of the Act. 
4. Forthwith post the attached notice in all 
places normally used by UUP to 
communicate information with bargaining 
unit employees and to include such notice 
prominently in the next available issue 
of UUP's newspaper. The Voice. 
DATED: July 8. 1987. 
Albany, New York 
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APPENDIX A 
AGENCY FEE REBATE PROCEDURE 
FOR THE 1984-85 FISCAL YEAR 
Any person making agency fee payments to the union under 
the agency shop provision in the union's collective bargaining 
agreement shall have the right to object to the expenditure of 
any part of the agency fee which represents the employee's 
pro-rata share of expenditures by the union or its affiliates 
in aid of activities or causes of a political or ideological 
nature only incidentally related to terms and conditions of 
employment. 
Such objections shall be made, if at all, by the objector 
individually notifying the Union President of his/her objection 
by registered or certified mail, during the period between 
September 1 and September 30 of each year of the fiscal year of 
the union to which the objection applies. 
Thereafter the agency fee shall be reduced in accordance 
with such objections by the approximate proportion of the 
agency fees spent by the union for such purposes, based on the 
latest fiscal year for which there is a completed and available 
audit. After the end of the fiscal year, and after the audit 
of the books is completed, the union shall determine the 
approximate proportion of agency fees actually spent by the 
union for such purposes during the fiscal year. After such 
final rebate determination is made an adjustment, if necessary, 
will be made in the refund amount. Objectors will be" required 
to refund to the union any excess refund they may have received. 
If an objector is dissatisfied with the final rebate 
determination, made after the close of the fiscal year, on the 
ground that it assertedly does not accurately reflect the 
expenditures of the Union in the defined area, he/she may 
appeal that determination to the Union's Executive Board. This 
appeal shall be in writing and sent to the Union President by 
certified or registered mail within thirty (30) days following 
receipt of the final rebate determination. 
If the objector is dissatisfied with the Executive Board's 
determination, the objector may appeal to a neutral by 
notifying the Union President by registered or certified mail 
within 30 days after receipt of the Executive Board's 
decision. The question of appropriateness of the rebate will 
be submitted by the union to a neutral party appointed by the 
union from lists to be supplied by the American Arbitration 
Association for hearing and resolution. The costs for any 
appeal to a neutral party shall be borne by the Union. Said 
appeal shall be heard expeditiously. 
The Union, at its option, may consolidate all appeals and 
have them resolved at one hearing for that purpose. An 
objector may present his/her appeal in person. 
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APPENDIX B 
AGENCY FEE REBATE PROCEDURE FOR 
THE 1985-86 FISCAL YEAR 
Any person making service payments to the Union in lieu of 
dues, pursuant to Chapter 677. Laws of 1977, as amended by 
Chapter 67B, Laws of 1977 and Chapter 122, Laws of 1978. shall 
have the right to object to the expenditure of any part of the 
agency fee which represents the employee's pro-rata share of 
expenditures by the Union or its affiliates in aid of 
activities or causes of a political or ideological nature only 
incidentally related to terms and conditions of employment. 
Such objections shall be made, if at all, by the objector 
by registered or certified mail, during the period between 
September 1 and September 30 of each year of the fiscal year of 
the Union to which the objection applies. 
Thereafter the agency fee shall be reduced in accordance 
with such objections by the approximate proportion of the 
agency fees spent by the Union for such-purposes, based on the 
latest fiscal year for which there is a completed and available 
audit. After the end of the fiscal year, and after the audit 
of the books is completed, the Union" shall determine the 
approximate proportion of agency fees actually spent by the 
Union for 6uch purposes during the fiscal year. After such 
final rebate determination is made an adjustment, if necessary, 
will be made in the refund amount. Objectors will be required 
to refund the Union any excess refund they may have received. 
Appeals 
If an objector is dissatisfied with the final rebate 
determination, made after the close of the fiscal year., on the 
ground that it assertedly does not accurately reflect the 
expenditures of the Union in the defined area, he/she may 
appeal that determination to the Union's Executive Board. This 
appeal shall be in writing and sent to the Union President by 
certified or registered mail within thirty (30) days following 
receipt of the final rebate determination. 
If the objector is dissatisfied with the Executive Board's 
determination. the objector may appeal to a neutral by 
notifying the Union President by registered or certified mail, 
within thirty (30) days after receipt of the Executive Board's 
decision. The question of appropriateness of the rebate will 
be submitted by the Union to a neutral party appointed by the 
Union from lists to be supplied by the American Arbitration 
Association for hearing and resolution. The costs for any 
appeal to a neutral party shall be borne by the Union. Said 
appeal shall be hear expeditiously. 
The Union, at its option, may consolidate all appeals and 
have them resolved at one hearing for that purpose. An 
objector may present his/her appeal in person. 
APPENDIX C 
AGENCY FEE REBATE PROCEDURE 
Any person making service payments to the 
Union in lieu of dues, pursuant to Chapter 677, 
Laws of 1977, as amended by Chapter 678, Laws of 
1977 and Chapter 122, Laws of 1978, shall have the 
right to object to the expenditure of any part of the 
agency fee which represents the employee's pro-rata 
share of expenditures by the Union or its affiliates in 
aid of activities or causes of a political or ideological 
nature only incidentallyvrelated to terms and condi-
tions of employment. 
Such objections shall be made, if at all, by the 
objector individually notifying the Union President 
of his/her objection by registered or certified mail, 
during the period between June 15 and June 30 of the 
year prior to the fiscal year of the Union to which the 
objection applies. 
The agency fee of such objectors shall be re-
duced for the next fiscal year by the approximate 
proportion of the agency fees spent by the Union for 
such purposes, based on the latest fiscal year for 
which there is a completed and available audit An 
The schedule of UUP expenses may be found on Pi 
FOR THE 1986*7 FISCAL YEAR 
objector shall be provided at the beginning of the 
new fiscal year with an advance payment equal to the 
amount of the reduction. 
If an objector is dissatisfied with the reduced fee 
on the ground that it allegedly does not accurately 
reflect the expenditures of the Union in the defined 
area, he/she may appeal that determination in 
writing and send it to the Union President by cer-
tified or registered mail within thirty (30) days 
following receipt of the advanced reduction. The 
question of appropriateness of the advance reduction 
will be submitted by the Union to a neutral party ap-
pointed by the American Arbitration Association for 
expeditious hearing arid resolution in accordance 
with its rules for agency fee arbitrations. The costs 
for any appeal to a neutral party shall be borne by the 
Union. Said appeal shall be heard expeditiously. 
The Union, at its option, may consolidate all ap-
peals and have them resolved at one hearing for that 
purpose. An objector may present his/her appeal in 
person. 
6 of the February/March edition of The VOICE. 
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NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees in the unit represented by the United 
University Professions, that it: 
1. Will forthwith refund to Thomas C. Barry and 
Morris E. Eson the total amount of agency 
fees deducted from their salaries for the 
1984-85, 1985-86 and 1986-87 fiscal years, 
with interest at the maximum legal rate. 
2. Will forthwith refund to Gordon Gallup the 
total amount of agency fees deducted from his 
salary for the 1986-87 fiscal year, with 
interest at the maximum legal rate. 
3. Will submit to this Board within 30 days of 
the date of this order a revised agency shop 
refund procedure which is in conformity with 
this decision, together with steps for 
immediate implementation thereof. Should UUP 
fail to do so, it shall immediately cease and 
_dfisist..frjojn'_imple.mje.nt.ina__tJ^ e_.lJ9_84_-r85.,_^  _' _. _ 
#2C-7/8/87 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF NASSAU (NASSAU COMMUNITY 
COLLEGE). 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-8 541 
ADJUNCT FACULTY ASSOCIATION OF NASSAU 
COMMUNITY COLLEGE, 
Charging Party. 
BEE, DE ANGELIS & EISMAN (PETER A. BEE, ESQ., of 
Counsel), for Respondent 
PRYOR. CASHMAN. SHERMAN & FLYNN (RONALD H. SHECHTMAN, 
ESQ. and RICHARD M. BETHEIL. ESQ.. of Counsel), for 
Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Adjunct 
Faculty Association of Nassau Community College (Association) 
to the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
dismissing its improper practice charge against the County of 
Nassau (Nassau Community College) (College). The charge, as 
originally filed, alleged violations of §209-a.l(a), (b). (d) 
and (e) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). 
The ALJ determined that the charge as it relates to 
§209-a.l(a) (b) and (d) should be dismissed since the facts 
"11051 
Board - U-8541 
-2 
alleged in the charge do not constitute a violation of those 
subdivisions. 
The ALJ heard and determined the charge, as clarified by 
letter of February 20, 1986, that the College violated 
§209-a.l(e) of the Act by unilaterally implementing new 
qxtalifications for employment in breach of §10.1(e) of the 
parties' expired collective bargaining agreement. The ALJ 
found that the Association had not met its burden of proving 
that the College violated §10.1(e) of the parties' expired 
collective bargaining agreement and that, therefore, it had 
failed to prove the claimed violation of §209-a.l(e) of the 
Act. The Association takes exception to the dismissal of its 
charged violation of §209-a.l(e) and to the ALJ's dismissal 
of its claimed violations of §209-a.l(a), (b) and (d). 
The College and the Association are parties to a 
collective bargaining agreement, effective October 1, 1982 to 
September 30, 1984. Although the parties' negotiations have 
been through the impasse procedures, no successor agreement 
has, to date, been reached. 
Section 10.1(e) of the expired agreement, on which the 
Association relies, states: 
Each adjunct department will maintain a 
list of courses for which each adjunct 
faculty member is academically qualified. 
This list will be prepared and updated 
annually by the department's adjunct 
supervising administrator in concert with 
the Adjunct Faculty Association. 
wliCS2 
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This section is part of §10, entitled "Seniority", pursuant to 
which appointments (assignments) are made to the adjunct 
faculty based on the number of semesters of prior adjunct 
service. It is conceded that the College may and does 
unilaterally set qualifications for employment at the time of 
initial hire. Section 18 of the parties' expired agreement is 
entitled "Probation" and provides that adjunct faculty will be 
on probation for one semester after "first employment". Upon 
satisfactory completion of such probationary period, the 
adjunct faculty member will be placed on a seniority list. 
This seniority list is not the list referred to in §10.1(e). 
Once an adjunct's name is on the seniority list, assignments 
are made pursuant to the provisions of §10 of the collective 
bargaining agreement. It is agreed that the lists called for 
by §10.1(e) have never been prepared. 
On November 11, 1985, the College ordered its department 
chairpersons to prepare for the "adjunct hiring process for 
Spring 1986" by developing a list of courses which, in their 
judgment, each individual is qualified to teach. The 
chairpersons were ordered to make these determinations based 
solely on their department's existing minimum qualifications. 
By a December 22, 1985 memorandum, the faculty of the 
department of history and political science was notified of 
these communications and of the list that resulted. On that 
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same day, Foster, an adjunct faculty member in said 
department for over 20 years, was notified by the College 
that he had been determined to be unqualified to teach any 
course at all and was invited to contact the College in order 
to discuss the matter. The College also determined that 
three other adjuncts in the history department, two in the 
art department and two in the communications department were 
not qualified. The Association received notice of such 
disqualification in January 1986, when adjunct employment 
contracts for the Spring 1986 semester were signed. 
Subsequent to the filing of the instant charge, step 2 
grievance decisions were issued regarding the College's 
determinations. Four of the individuals were found to be 
qualified and their grievances were upheld; the other four, 
including Foster, were determined to be unqualified and their 
grievances were denied. As to some, the issue was their 
qualification to teach a particular course or courses within 
their department; as to others, the issue related to their 
qualification to teach within their departments at all. 
ALJ DECISION 
The issue presented to the ALJ by the Association was 
whether §10.1(e) of the parties' expired agreement precluded 
the College from altering its qualifications for employment 
as to individuals once hired. Conceding that the College may 
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set initial qualifications for employment, the Association 
urged that §10.1(e) precluded the College from altering its 
qualifications thereafter. The ALJ determined that this 
claim failed for lack of supporting record facts. She found 
that the evidence "appears to indicate" that adjunct 
employment is not continuing but occurs pursuant to 
semester-long employment contracts. In that view of the 
relationship, she concluded that qualifications may be reset 
by the College with each hiring since it is agreed that 
§10.1(e) is not applicable to initial hiring. The ALJ also 
found that even assuming that the adjunct faculty status was 
that of continuing employment or appointment, the Association 
failed to meet its burden of establishing the meaning of 
§10.1(e). She concluded that the record evidence regarding 
the meaning of §10.1(e) is "equivocal at best" and that, 
therefore, the Association has failed to meet its burden. 
EXCEPTIONS 
In its exceptions, the Association urges that the ALJ 
erred in finding that the adjuncts' employment is not of a 
continuing nature; in finding that the evidence of the 
meaning of §10.1(e) is "equivocal"; in failing to find that 
the employer had always deemed an adjunct faculty member who 
successfully taught a course academically qualified to teach 
the course in the future; and in failing to find that 
placement of adjunct faculty members on the seniority list 
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after successfully completing a probationary period 
constituted recognition that they were academically qualified. 
The Association urges that the evidence in the record 
supports the conclusion that the College altered the 
standards for academic qualification unilaterally, in 
violation of the adjunct faculty's contract rights. 
DISCUSSION 
The question presented by this case is whether the facts 
establish a refusal "to continue [a term] of an expired 
agreement until a new agreement is negotiated" in violation 
of §209-a.l(e) of the Act. A proper disposition of the case 
depends on our interpretation of the term "academically 
qualified" in §10.1(e) of the parties' collective bargaining 
contract. 
The record establishes that the College did, during 
November and December, 1985, prepare what amounts to a list 
of "academically qualified" adjunct faculty members. The 
record also establishes that, in preparing such list, the 
College utilized standards of "academic qualification" which 
had not previously been followed. The effect was a 
determination that certain long-standing adjunct faculty 
members were not "academically qualified" to teach courses 
they were previously considered "academically qualified" to 
teach. Some, in fact, were found not academically qualified 
to teach any courses. The record is also clear that such 
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list was not prepared "in concert with the Adjunct Faculty 
Association." 
In this case, the Association charges that the College, 
in preparing "a list of courses for which each adjunct 
faculty member is academically qualified", unilaterally 
applied new standards of academic qualification to 
long-standing adjunct faculty members who had previously been 
considered "academically qualified" pursuant to the 
procedures incorporated in the parties' collective bargaining 
agreement. 
The meaning of §10.1(e) can only be understood by 
reference to other provisions of the contract. The entire 
section on seniority, coupled with the section relating to 
probation, indicates that the parties have created, through 
their collective bargaining, an unusual relationship. 
Although adjunct faculty members are employed under separate 
semester-long individual contracts and do not have 
"continuing" employment in the customary sense, their 
collective bargaining agreement has created a kind of 
"tenure". While the College undoubtedly reserves the right 
to determine qualifications when an adjunct is first hired, 
the satisfactory completion of one semester of teaching a 
course will accord an adjunct certain rights with regard to 
teaching that course in the future. The adjunct's name will 
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be placed on a seniority list from which the adjunct cannot 
be removed except for cause. 
We construe §10.1(e) as requiring that the list of 
courses for which adjunct faculty members are academically 
qualified should be prepared on the basis of the procedures 
agreed to by the parties in the collective bargaining 
agreement. Contrary to the ALJ, we find that there is 
sufficient evidence in this record to establish that §10.1(e) 
precludes the College from unilaterally determining that 
adjunct faculty members who had previously been considered 
academically qualified were no longer academically qualified 
solely on the basis of newly-imposed standards of academic 
qualification. 
The College urges that the Association's charge is 
barred by the principles of res judicata by virtue of our 
decision in County of Nassau (Nassau Community College). 
19 PERB ir3040 (1986). In that case, we determined that the 
seniority clause in the parties' expired collective 
bargaining contract did not make seniority the sole basis for 
assignment of adjunct faculty members, but subordinated 
seniority to the College's right to determine 
qualifications. To the extent that the Association 
reiterates its earlier contention that seniority is the sole 
basis for assignment, we would agree that the Association is 
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barred from relitigating that issue. However, the 
Association also claims herein that placement of adjunct 
faculty members on the seniority list after completing a 
probationary period constituted recognition that they were 
academically qualified. Our earlier decision did not 
consider or determine this issue. Consequently, the claim 
made by the Association in this case is not barred from 
consideration now. Nothing in our prior decision precludes 
us from now determining that §10.1(e) of the parties' 
contract binds the College to its earlier decisions regarding 
academic qualifications. Our prior decision did not 
authorize the College to find that adjunct faculty members 
who were considered academically qualified for many years 
were not now academically qualified. 
The College also argues that, inasmuch as it is agreed 
that the list contemplated by §10.1(e) was never previously 
prepared, the College cannot now be found in violation of CSL 
§209-a.l(e). Conceivably, the College could offer such a 
defense if it were charged with a refusal to implement 
§10.1(e) at all. Here, however, the College chose to prepare 
a list of "academically qualified" adjunct faculty members. 
It may not do so, except in conformity with §10.1(e). The 
preparation of the list by the College in violation of 
§10.1(e) violates CSL §209-a.l(e). 
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We also reject the College's contention that the 
Association's charge was not timely. The charge was filed 
within four months of the actions complained of. The letter 
of September 12, 1985 advised that adjunct course assignments 
would not be made solely on the basis of seniority. It did 
not give the Association sufficient notice of actions 
subsequently taken, which are the subject of this charge. 
Finally, having reviewed the charge and the record in 
this case, we affirm the ALJ's dismissal of that portion of 
the charge which alleged violations of §209-a.l(a). (b) and 
(d) of the Act. 
Accordingly, we reverse the ALJ and we find that the 
College has violated §209-a.l(e) of the Act by failing to 
conform to the requirements of §10.1(e) of the parties' 
expired agreement. 
NOW. THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the County of Nassau 
(Nassau Community College): 
1. Forthwith rescind its determinations that 
adjunct faculty members who had previously been 
placed on the seniority list are no longer 
academically qualified; 
2. Comply in all respects with the provisions of 
§10.1(e) of the parties' expired collective 
bargaining agreement until a new agreement is 
negotiated; and 
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3. Sign and post notice in the form attached at 
all locations at which any unit employees work 
in places ordinarily used to post notices of 
information to unit employees. 
DATED: July 8. 1987 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
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APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL E 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees represented by the Adjunct Faculty Association of 
Nassau Community College that the County of Nassau (Nassau Community College): 
1. Will forthwith rescind its determinations that adjunct 
faculty members who had previously been placed on the 
seniority list gtp&~ no- longer ^ academically qualified. 
2.. Will comply in all respects with the provisions of §10.1(e) 
of the parties' expired collective bargaining agreement until 
a new agreement is negotiated. 
. . . .County, of .Nassau. .(Nassau. Community. College) 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
STATE OF NEW YORK (DIVISION OF 
STATE POLICE), 
Respondent. 
-and- CASE NO. U-906 6 
POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE TROOPERS. INC.. 
Charging Party. 
JOSEPH M. BRESS. ESQ.. General Counsel. Governor's 
Office of Employee Relations (RICHARD J. DAUTNER. 
Esq., of Counsel), for Respondent 
HINMAN, STRAUB. PIGORS and MANNING. P.C. (WILLIAM 
SHEEHAN. Esq., of Counsel), for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of Police 
Benevolent Association of the New York State Troopers. Inc. 
(PBA) to a decision of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
dismissing, prior to hearing, its charge that the State of 
New York (Division of State Police) (State) violated 
§209-a.l(d) of the Taylor Law when it unilaterally 
implemented drug testing— in relation to bargaining unit 
employees. 
i/The charge did not address the negotiability of the 
procedures implementing drug testing. We accordingly do 
not address that issue here. 
11G63 
Board - U-9066 -2 
The ALJ found that this Board is without jurisdiction of the 
. . . 2/ 
charge pursuant to Civil Service Law §205.5(d). — 
FACTS 
PBA is the certified bargaining representative of three 
units of employees within the Division of New York State 
Police. The instant improper practice charge was filed on 
behalf of employees in all three units, relating to the 
implementation of drug testing applied to all three units of 
employees. The State raised as an affirmative defense in its 
answer the claim that implementation of the drug testing is 
covered by the parties' collective bargaining agreement, and 
that PERB is accordingly without jurisdiction of the charge. 
Each agreement between PBA and the State for the three 
units of employees includes the following provision: 
No member shall be ordered or asked to submit 
to a Polygraph (lie detector) test, blood 
test, a Breathalyzer test or any other test or 
procedure which would violate his rights under 
the United States or New York State 
Constitutions for any reason. Such test may 
be given if requested by the member. 
2/section 205.5(d), CSL provides: "The Board shall 
not have authority to enforce an agreement between an 
employer and an employee and shall not exercise 
jurisdiction over an alleged violation of such an agreement 
that would not otherwise constitute an improper employer or 
employee organization practice . . . ." 
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This language first appeared in the parties' collective 
bargaining agreement in 1973, as to troopers, investigators 
and non-commissioned officers. It first appeared in a 
collective bargaining agreement covering officers in a 1979 
agreement. Subseguently, there apparently has been no 
negotiating history concerning the meaning or application of 
the language, which has continued in place in subsequent 
collective bargaining agreements, up to and including the 
present. 
The at-issue language replaced previous language, which 
provided as follows: 
No member shall be ordered or asked to 
submit to a blood test, a breathalyzer test 
or any other test to determine the 
percentage of alcohol in the blood for any 
reason except as may be provided otherwise 
by specific statutory law. Such test may be 
given if requested by the member. 
On or about August 7. 1986. the Division of State Police 
issued a new policy and procedure applicable throughout the 
Division, which requires the testing of members of the 
Division in the event that a reasonable suspicion exists that 
the member is impaired by drugs while on duty. A detailed 
procedure was set forth in a memorandum dated August 7, 1986, 
and numbered Interim Order 86-32. The procedure was not 
negotiated with the bargaining agent of the affected 
employees prior to its implementation, and the instant 
improper practice charge ensued. 
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DISCUSSION 
In reviewing language of the previous and current 
collective bargaining agreements before him, the ALJ found 
that the current language is considerably broader in scope, 
covering tests and procedures of any type, and not simply 
tests and procedures related to determining the percentage of 
alcohol in the blood, as was the case in the previous 
agreements. The ALJ found this broadened language to be 
significant in determining that the parties had negotiated the 
issue of testing of bargaining unit members, regardless of the 
purpose for which the testing was conducted. 
Although giving credit to the assertions of the PBA that 
there was no discussion of drug testing during the 
negotiations which led to the current collective bargaining 
agreements, he nevertheless found that the language of the 
agreements encompasses the issue of drug testing as well as 
testing for alcohol consumption and veracity. 
Applying prior PERB case law to these facts, the ALJ 
concluded that the collective bargaining agreement between the 
parties covers the range of testing, including drug testing, 
"in a comprehensive manner and thus may reasonably be found to 
manifest the parties' intention to embrace this particular 
3/ 
aspect of the broad subject matter negotiated."-
I/County of Nassau. 16 PERB ir3043. at 3067 (1983). 
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Despite the fact that the charging party makes an offer 
of proof that the parties at no time negotiated concerning 
the specific issue of drug testing and that the parties did 
not intend to cover the subject of drug testing when they 
negotiated the contract language at issue, we find that the 
contract language at issue so broadly covers the issue of 
testing, that drug testing must be deemed to be included 
within the broad scope of the language even in the absence of 
specific discussion of that particular topic. The reason for 
this finding is that the contract language at issue is clear 
and unambiguous in its reference to "any other test or 
procedure". The reference in the contract language to 
veracity as well as alcohol impairment tests and other tests 
indicates that the scope of the language in the current 
agreements goes considerably beyond the scope of the language 
contained in the prior agreements, which related specifically 
to any tests used "to determine the percentage of alcohol in 
the blood". This broadening of the contract language to 
include any other test or procedure is clear and unambiguous, 
in our view, and accordingly must be considered to have 
application to drug testing, even though that subject was not 
mentioned during the course of collective negotiations. 
Based upon the foregoing, and upon the line of cases 
previously decided by this Board, finding that where the 
parties' agreement "covers the subject", this Board is 
without jurisdiction pursuant to §205.5(d) of the Taylor 
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4/ . . . . . 
Law.- We hereby AFFIRM the decision of the Administrative 
Law Judge and ORDER that the charge be, and the same hereby 
is, dismissed. 
DATED: July 8, 1987 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
uu6z./? 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membe 
1/See, e.g. . St. Lawrence County, 10 PERB «ir3058 




STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
GREENBURGH CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 7. 
CASE NO. E-1266 
Upon the application for Designation of 
Persons as Managerial or Confidential. 
RUSKIN & GYORY. ESQS. (RICHARD GYORY. ESQ., of Counsel), 
for Greenburgh Central School District No. 7 
BOZEMAN & ROBERTS. P.C. (BRUCE L. BOZEMAN. ESQ.. of 
Counsel), for Greenburgh Civil Service Organization 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the 
Greenburgh Civil Service Organization (GCSO) to the decision 
of the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director) granting the application of the 
Greenburgh Central School District No. 7 (District) to 
designate Elizabeth Bonnano. Secretary to Superintendent of 
Schools; Anna Patalano, Administrative Aide to Associate 
Superintendent of Schools; and Vasilike Petroff, Secretary 
to Assistant Superintendent of Schools, as confidential 
employees of the District. 
The exceptions filed by GCSO relate only to the 
designation of Vasilike Petroff. and not to the other two 
positions. GCSO argues that the evidence does not establish 
that the person for whom Petroff works is a managerial 
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employee within the meaning of the Public Employees Fair 
Employment Act (Act), in that, contrary to the finding of 
the Director, Jack Glazier, as Assistant Superintendent of 
Schools, for whom Petroff works, does not have direct 
responsibility for personnel administration. 
The District has filed cross-exceptions to the 
Director's decision, asserting that the Director should have 
found that Petroff's supervisor. Glazier, is entitled to 
managerial status based upon his direct assistance in the 
preparation for conduct of collective negotiations, and his 
major role in the administration of agreements. The 
District accordingly contends that the Director's 
determination that Glazier's managerial status rested solely 
upon a finding of Glazier's direct assistance in personnel 
administration was erroneous. 
Section 201.7 (a) of the Act defines persons as 
managerial if they are persons 
(i) who formulate policy or (ii) who may 
reasonably be required on behalf of the 
public employer to assist directly in the 
preparation for and conduct of collective 
negotiations or to have a major role in the 
administration of agreements or in personnel 
administration provided that such role is not 
of a routine or clerical nature and requires 
the exercise of independent judgment. 
Employees may be designated as confidential 
only if they are persons who assist and act 
in a confidential capacity to managerial 
employees described in clause (ii). 
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Petroff's confidential status thus hinges upon Glazier's 
status and duties as a managerial employee pursuant to 
§201.7(a) of the Act. It is not contended by GCSO that 
Petroff does not act in a confidential capacity to Glazier, 
but simply that Glazier does not act in a managerial 
capacity as found by the Director. 
The evidence presented by the District shows that the 
administrative staff of the District's central office 
consists of three persons: Frelow, Superintendent of 
Schools; Corda, Associate Superintendent of Schools; and 
Glazier, Assistant Superintendent of Schools. The Associate 
and Assistant Superintendents are authorized to, and do in 
fact, act in the capacity of Superintendent, in the absence 
of the Superintendent. Corda is the primary fiscal officer 
of the District, and has responsibility for personnel 
administration with respect to nonteaching personnel. 
Glazier is responsible for the District's curriculum 
development, and is responsible for personnel administration 
with respect to teaching personnel, who constitute the bulk 
of the 350-member staff of the District. Glazier is the 
administrative representative on the Board of Education's 
personnel committee and has responsibility for dealing with 
the union leadership concerning possible violations of the 
teaching staff collective bargaining agreements. He is 
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responsible for the recruitment, screening, and 
recommendation of teaching personnel. 
DISCUSSION 
Having reviewed the record, we conclude that there is 
sufficient evidence in it to support the conclusion that 
Glazier's duties in personnel administration entitle him to 
managerial status. For example. Superintendent of Schools 
Frelow testified, without contradiction: 
Mr. Glazier, the Assistant Superintendent, is 
responsible for supervising the 
implementation of the District [curriculum] 
program . . . . In that capacity, he manages 
our personnel operation, particularly, our 
classroom teachers and all other supportive 
personnel. He is responsible for evaluating 
personnel who supervise the classroom 
teachers, he supervises directly the 
District-wide program and other 
administrators who have District-wide 
responsibility, such as our special education 
program and other programs that deal with 
District-wide features, our gifted and 
talented program. So, in general, Mr. 
Glazier is the, quote, manager, unquote, of 
our curriculum implementation programs and 
all related services thereto. 
As Frelow1s designee to the Board of Education's 
personnel committee. Glazier functions as follows: 
I am the administrative representative to the 
Board's personnel committee [which] regularly 
reviews the evaluation reports, requests 
additional information on personnel, gives 
directions to administration . . . . [The] 
administration in turn prepares issues or 
policies for the personnel committee to 
review and then ultimately to recommend to 
the Board of Education. 
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Glazier's participation on the personnel committee of the 
Board of Education, in addition to his other duties, 
constitutes participation in personnel administration on a 
district-wide level. 
In view of the evidence that Glazier acts as the 
Superintendent's designee with respect to teaching personnel 
matters, we share the Director's conclusion that Glazier is 
managerial.— 
Having adopted the Director's conclusion on the basis 
of this area of Glazier's responsibility, it is not 
necessary for us to reach the cross-exceptions filed by the 
District to the Director's decision, which argue that 
Glazier derives managerial status from his assistance in the 
preparation for conduct of collective negotiations and his 
role in the administration of agreements. Since §201.7(a) 
provides alternative and not cumulative bases for 
determining whether a person is entitled to managerial 
status, if the person meets one of the criteria set forth in 
said section, it is not necessary to determine whether he 
would also be entitled to managerial status under any of the 
other criteria contained in the statute. 
1/Richmondville CSD. 18 PERB 1f4025 (1985). and cases 
cited therein. 
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Having so found, and in the absence of any claim that 
Petroff does not act in a confidential capacity to Glazier, 
the Director's finding that Petroff is confidential is hereby 
affirmed. 
NOW. THEREFORE. WE ORDER that Elizabeth Bonnano, 
Secretary to Superintendent of Schools; Anna Patalano. 
Administrative Aide; and Vasilike Petroff, Secretary to 
Assistant Superintendent, be, and they hereby are, designated 
as confidential employees. 
DATED: July 8. 1987 
Albany. New York 
Walter L. Eisenberg. Membe 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OF ULSTER. 
Employer. 
-^and- CASE NO. C-3216 




LOCAL UNION NO. 445. INTERNATIONAL 
BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS. CHAUFFEURS'. 
WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Federation of Police 
Officers, Inc. has been designated and selected by a majority of 
the employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit 
agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
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Unit: Included: All full-time and regular part-time 
employees in the following titles: 
patrolmen, sergeants and dispatchers. 
Excluded: Chief of police, captains. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the United Federation of Police 
Officers. Inc. To negotiate collectively is the performance of 
their mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in 
good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or 
any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party, but such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: July 8. 1987 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg. Membgr\ 
< j \ * i * m 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
GLENS FALLS CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT. 
Employer, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3102 
SOUTHERN ADIRONDACK SUBSTITUTE TEACHER 
ALLIANCE. 
Petitioner. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Southern Adirondack 
Substitute Teacher Alliance has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All per diem substitutes who have 
received a reaonable assurance of 
continuing employment, as referenced in 
§201.7(d) of the Civil Service Law. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
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FURTHER. IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Southern Adirondack 
Substitute Teacher Alliance. To negotiate collectively is the 
performance of their mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of 
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party, but such obligation does 
not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the 
making of a concession. 
DATED: July 8, 1987 
Albany. New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
UtJs£z^Z^ 
Walter L. Eisenberg. Memb/r 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SOUTH GLENS FALLS CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3105 
SOUTHERN ADIRONDACK SUBSTITUTE TEACHER 
ALLIANCE. 
Petitioner. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Southern Adirondack 
Substitute Teacher Alliance has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All per diem substitutes who have 
received a reaonable assurance of 
continuing employment, as referenced in 
§201.7(d) of the Civil Service Law. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
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FURTHER. IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Southern Adirondack 
Substitute Teacher Alliance. To negotiate collectively is the 
performance of their mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of 
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party, but such obligation does 
not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the 
making of a concession. 
DATED: July 8. 1987 
Albany, New York 
K0C£?-m~<&Tt 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
- ^ 
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Walter L. Eisenberg. Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OF OGDEN. 
Employer, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3208 
TOWN OF OGDEN HIGHWAY UNIT. LOCAL 
1170 COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF 
AMERICA, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Town of Ogden Highway Unit, 
Local 1170 Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: All regular full-time and part-time 
employees of the Highway Department of 
the Town of Ogden employed in the 
following titles: laborer, motor 
eguipment operator, mechanic, mechanic 
helper and foreman. 
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Excluded: Clerical and other employees currently 
covered in the OHE and ONESE bargaining 
units, the foreman/assistant to the 
highway superintendent, the highway 
superintendent, and temporary employees 
working six months or less in a calendar 
year. 
FURTHER. IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Town of Ogden Highway Unit, 
Local 1170 Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO. To 
negotiate collectively is the performance of their mutual 
obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith 
with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question 
arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement 
incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party, 
but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: July 8, 1987 
Albany, New York 
'CUTA 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg. Member 
11082 
#3E-7/8/87 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
VILLAGE OF HIGHLAND FALLS. 
Employer, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3116 
UNITED FEDERATION OF POLICE OFFICERS. 
Petitioner. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Federation of Police 
Officers has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the units agreed 
upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
settlement of grievances. 
Dispatchers Unit: 
Included: All full time dispatchers. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
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Police Officers Unit: 
Included: All full time police officers. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER. IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the United Federation of Police 
Officers. To negotiate collectively is the performance of their 
mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good 
faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or 
any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party, but such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: July 8, 1987 
Albany, New York 
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